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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
10-3580 
_______________ 
 
 
SAMUEL M. MELE, INDIVIDUALLY, 
d/b/a STANTON SALES, 
 
       Appellants 
 
v. 
 
TSE SYSTEMS GMBH; TSE SYSTEMS INC. 
 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 5-09-cv-00174) 
District Judge: Hon. Juan R. Sanchez 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 15, 2011 
 
BEFORE: FISHER, JORDAN and COWEN , Circuit Judges 
 
 (Filed:  May 4, 2011) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
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  Appellant, Samuel M. Mele, appeals from the District Court’s orders entering 
summary judgment in favor of Appellees, TSE Systems, Inc. (“TSE”) and TSE Systems, 
GmbH (“TSE, GmbH”), on his claims for breach of contract and tortious interference 
with contractual relations.  Mele also appeals from the District Court’s order denying his 
motion to amend his complaint.  For substantially the same reasons discussed by the 
District Court in its memorandum opinions and orders, we will affirm.  
I. 
 Mele is an independent salesman and the sole proprietor of Stanton Sales, a 
business that contracts with medical supplies manufacturers and distributors to sell 
equipment to universities and research laboratories.  On August 1, 2005, Mele, on behalf 
of Stanton Sales, entered into an agreement (the “Agreement”) with TSE that appointed 
Stanton Sales as a “non-exclusive sales commission representative for Products in the 
Northeast and Southeast territory.”  Mele v. TSE Sys., No. 09-174, 2010 WL 3075741, at 
*1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2010).  As a non-exclusive sales commission representative, Mele 
agreed to “perform primarily as a sales and market development specialist, to promote 
sales growth of TSE products in the Territory, and to be the primary, but not exclusive, 
interface with the customers for purposes of developing, securing, and servicing the sale 
of Product at accounts in the Territory.”  Id. 
 The initial term of the Agreement was August 1, 2005 through March 31, 2006.   
TSE then exercised its discretion to extend the Agreement twice for two twelve-month 
periods.  Prior to the term beginning April 1, 2008, however, TSE declined to renew the 
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Agreement.  Accordingly, on January 28, 2008, TSE informed Mele that the Agreement 
would terminate on March 31, 2008.   
 On January 13, 2009, Mele filed a complaint in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against TSE and its parent company, TSE, 
GmbH.  In the complaint, Mele claimed that TSE had breached the Agreement in several 
respects and that TSE, GmbH had intentionally interfered with his contractual 
relationship with TSE.
1
   
 After discovery, TSE and TSE, GmbH moved for summary judgment.  Shortly 
thereafter, Mele filed a motion to amend his complaint.  The District Court granted the 
defendants’ motions, denied Mele’s, and entered judgment against him.  Mele now 
appeals from the District Court’s orders.2   
II. 
  Mele first argues that the District Court erred in entering judgment in favor of 
TSE on his breach of contract claims.  Mele contends that, contrary to the District Court’s 
determination, several provisions of the Agreement are ambiguous, and the extrinsic 
evidence demonstrates that he was entitled to commissions on all sales within his 
territory as well as on sales completed within ninety days after the Agreement was 
                                                 
 1  The District Court dismissed Mele’s additional claims against TSE and TSE, 
GmbH by orders entered May 12, 2009 and June 15, 2009, respectively.  
 
 2  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s summary judgment rulings.  Packard v. Pittsburgh Transp. Co., 
418 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2005).  We review the denial of leave to amend for abuse of 
discretion.  See Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2004).   
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terminated.  We disagree.  The District Court properly applied Michigan law
3
 and 
correctly concluded that, based on the unambiguous terms of the Agreement, TSE was 
not required to pay Mele commissions on sales within his territory for which he was not 
primarily responsible, nor was TSE required to pay him commissions on orders placed 
after the Agreement was terminated on March 31, 2008.  Although Mele insists that the 
extrinsic evidence demonstrates otherwise, the District Court properly declined to 
consider this evidence because the terms of the Agreement are not ambiguous.  See 
UAW-GM Human Res. Ctr. v. KSL Recreation Corp., 579 N.W.2d 411, 491 (Mich. App. 
1998) (“This court does not have the right to make a different contract for the parties or 
to look to extrinsic testimony to determine their intent when the words used by them are 
clear and unambiguous and have a definite meaning.”).  Furthermore, we reject Mele’s 
argument that the Agreement, when viewed in conjunction with the extrinsic evidence, 
contained a latent ambiguity concerning orders placed after the termination date.     
 Next, Mele argues that the District Court erred in entering judgment in favor of 
TSE, GmbH on his claim for tortious interference with contractual relations.  Mele 
essentially claims that TSE, GmbH executives took various actions against him in 
furtherance of their goal to replace outside representatives like Mele with an inside sales 
force.  As the District Court explained however, none of the evidence that Mele 
submitted sufficiently demonstrates that TSE, GmbH executives intended to harm him by 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 3 The parties agree that, pursuant to a choice of law clause in the Agreement, 
Michigan law governs Mele’s breach of contract claims.   
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interfering with his ability to succeed at TSE or were otherwise inappropriately involved 
in the decision to terminate the Agreement.
4
   See Schulman v. J.P. Morgan Inv. Mgmt., 
35 F.3d 799, 807 n.14 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining that, in order to establish a claim for 
intentional interference with contractual relations under Pennsylvania law, the plaintiff 
must show, inter alia, an intent on the part of the defendant to harm the plaintiff by 
interfering with a contractual relationship).  Therefore, the District Court’s denial of this 
claim was proper.  
 Lastly, Mele argues that the District Court abused its discretion by denying his 
motion to amend his complaint.  In November 2009, approximately two months after the 
close of discovery and one month after the defendants had moved for summary judgment, 
Mele requested leave to supplement his complaint with a claim for damages under the 
Michigan Sales Representative Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2961, et seq. (the 
“MSRA”), a state statute that does not provide an independent cause of action but 
imposes additional penalties for nonpayment of commissions to sales representatives.  
The District Court denied Mele’s motion on the ground that he had failed to show good 
cause for his delay, see Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962), and because, given its 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 4  Mele directs most of his complaints towards Jens-Uwe Engler, whom he claims 
was inappropriately involved in the decision to terminate him.  As the District Court 
noted, however, Engler served as both the CEO of TSE, GmbH and Chairman of TSE’s 
Board of Directors, and Mele failed to present evidence indicating that Engler was acting 
on behalf of TSE, GmbH—and not TSE—at the relevant times.  See Triffin v. Janssen, 
626 A.2d 571, 574 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (explaining that “Pennsylvania courts 
require the plaintiff, as part of his prima facie case, to show that the defendant’s conduct 
was not justified” or privileged).   
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denial of his breach of contract and tortious interference with contractual relations claims, 
amendment would be futile, see Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  We see no error in the District Court’s decision.  
III. 
 We have reviewed Mele’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are 
without merit.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s orders.  
